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Abstract
Rainwater harvesting, consisting in collecting runo¤ from precipitation, has been
widely developed to stop groundwater declines and even raise water tables. However
this expected environmental e¤ect is not self-evident. We showin a simple setting that
the success of this conjunctive use depends on whether the runo¤ rate is above a threshold
value. Moreover, the bigger the storage capacity, the higher the runo¤ rate must be to
obtain an environmentally e¢ cient system. We also extend the model to include other
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1. Introduction
The depletion of groundwater has generated new interest in the oldest human technol-
ogy developed to provide a water supply: rainwater harvesting systems. The rst evidence
of the collection of rainwater dates back 6,000 years in the Gangsu region of China, which
has a semi-arid to arid continental climate [12]. Rain storage was also particularly impor-
tant in Southern India, where dams were built by the villagers to capture rainwater from
the monsoons [29], in small islands with no signicant river systems [20] and in remote and
arid locations [25]. Although this traditional technique was largely abandoned in favor of
large-scale projects, it has enjoyed a revival in popularity since the early 20th century. For
instance, Gibraltar has one of the largest rainwater collection systems in existence and
rainwater is still the primary water source on many US ranches. Furthermore, the United
Nations Environment Program3 reported that in 2000, the Gansu province in China had
built 2,183,000 rainwater tanks with a capacity of 73.1 million cubic meters, supplying
drinking water and supplementary irrigation. More recently, the Rainwater Partnership,
registered with the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, was established in 2004
to promote this practice and its integration into water resource management policies. In
parallel, a lot of international cooperation encourages rainwater harvesting by nancing
projects all around the world. For example, Canada nanced the Hebei Dryland Project
in China between 1989 and 2000, while the UN Food and Agriculture Organization sup-
ported projects in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, and more recently a cooperative
project between Germany and Tunisia was carried out.4
This renewed popularity is at least partially due to the fact that this technology is
often presented as the simplest and most a¤ordable way to stop groundwater declines and
even raise water tables [30]. However, to the best of our knowledge, no study, except Stahn
and Tomini [35], examines whether this solution is actually environmentally acceptable,
in terms of both reducing extraction and raising water tables.
However, because, the ow of collected rainwater is constrained by the capacity of the
storage technology,. rainwater harvesting can only substitute for part of existing water
sources. This capacity -constraint implies that groundwater may still be extracted as a
supplemental source of water to meet water demands. We should therefore consider rain-
water harvesting with some caution within the context of conjunctive use management.
Moreover, this method is dependent on local conditions like precipitation and surface
runo¤ [3]. since rainwater harvesting involves either collecting rainfall directly where it
falls or collecting the runo¤ originating from it. This allows to mitigate water losses and
consequently increases water supplies. However, this additional water supply may lead to
a decline in the value of groundwater, since the dependence on its stock decreases, and this
may in turn encourage people to increase current extraction from the ground and thereby
contribute to a long-term decline in the water table. At the opposite extreme, when all
3See http://www.unep.or.jp/ietc/publications/urban/urbanenv-2/9.asp)
4For more details, see Annex 1 of the study Agricultural Technologies for Developing Countries of the
European parliament.
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water runs overland, meaning that the aquifer is nonrenewable, some stock of reserve will
remain in the ground when rainwater is collected at the surface, whereas if groundwater
was the only water supply, the aquifer would be depleted. As local conditions may vary
greatly from one area to another, the environmental success or failure of this technology
is therefore far from self-evident.
The purpose of this paper is to extend the literature on conjunctive use to adequately
consider the environmental potential of rainwater harvesting. Our results will di¤erentiate
between the situations in which conjunctive use has a positive long-term impact on the
water table, and those in which it does not. More precisely, the discussion is formulated
to compare the long-term water table level resulting from optimal conjunctive use of
groundwater and rainwater storage with the level when no rainwater is collected. For
optimal use, the collection of rainwater must begin before the steady state is reached,
and it must be e¢ cient to use both water sources simultaneously over the long run. Our
model allows us to dene the conditions under which such a conjunctive use optimally
emerges. We then show that below a threshold value of runo¤, rainwater harvesting is
economically optimal but not environmentally e¢ cient, because the water table is lower
than it would be without any rainwater storage. To rene the analysis, we rst introduce
our results in a basic setting, and then extend our framework to include the hydrological
inuences of other parameters a¤ecting storage and the recharge of the aquifer, as well as
ecological damages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some
background on models of groundwater management, which provide various explanations of
aquifer depletion. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the model of conjunctive use of groundwater
and rainwater under a capacity constraint in a basic setting, and derive the optimal use
of groundwater when there is no collection of rainwater. Section 5 presents an analysis of
environmental e¢ ciency with an implicit determination of the threshold value of runo¤
rates above which rainwater harvesting allows to raise the water table over the long term.
Sections 6 and 7 derive some extensions to incorporate improvements regarding the water
system and ecological damages. Finally, section 8 provides some concluding remarks. An
appendix contains all the proofs. They work out in a completely integrated case which
covers the results of the di¤erent sections5.
2. Background of groundwater management
Groundwater management has generated a substantial literature in resource eco-
nomics. Since the seminal work of Gisser and Sánchez [14], many studies have focused
on the e¤ects of the absence of central control (e.g., Allen and Gisser [1], Feirnermann
and Knapp [10] or more recently Koundouri [17]). Such absence intuitively leads to the
depletion of groundwater, because agents fail to take various externalities into account
(Provencher and Burt [28]). Most studies compare myopic farmers, under perfect com-
petition, with a social planners solution focusing on the stock externality (Feirnerman
5The detailed proofs are available upon request.
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and Knapp [10], Nieswiadomy [24], Brill and Burness [4]). Others address strategic be-
havior (Negri [23], Provencher and Burt [28] or Rubio and Casino [32]). However, the
magnitude of the adverse consequences on resource stocks and the potential benets from
groundwater management are still controversial.
Another part of the literature deals with issues of groundwater quality; either from
a pollution control perspective (Vickner et al. [38], Yadav [40] or Xepapadeas [39]) or
explaining the relationship between contamination and water-use decisions (Roseta-Palma
[31], Hellegers et al. [15]). This last set of studies highlights additional externalities due to
the e¤ect of pumping on aquifer contamination. Roseta-Palma [31] shows that the steady
state value of the water table level is always higher in quantity-quality models than in
quantity-only models.
Finally, another strand of the literature investigates the optimal management of ground-
water under the conjunctive use of di¤erent water resources: surface water and ground-
water (e.g., Burt [6], Provencher [27], Tsur [36]), multiple aquifers (Zeitouni and Dinar
[41], Roumasset and Wada [33]), or rainwater and groundwater (Stahn and Tomini [35]).
However, most of the models that analyze the conjunctive use of groundwater and surface
water di¤er very little from typical groundwater-only models. They assume that ground-
water is the single control variable used to supplement a xed amount of surface water,
as a back-up supply. There are a handful of papers that explore an additional externality
when surface water is stochastic (Knapp and Olson [19], Gemma and Tsur [13], Tsur and
Graham-Tomasi [37]). Ignoring the role of the resource as a bu¤er creates ine¢ ciencies
and therefore aquifer depletion. Moreover, few papers consider water sources of di¤er-
ent qualities. Dinar and Xepapadeas [7] empirically show that an individual monitoring
regime is superior to central monitoring in preventing degradation of the quality and
depletion of the quantity of water in the aquifer when farmers use water from a central
surface supply and simultaneously extract from the ground.
However, neither the early literature nor more recent studies consider the hydrologic
link between groundwater and surface water. Since conjunctive use is often considered in
discussing water conservation and the harmonious use of water resources to avoid undesir-
able e¤ects (FAO [9]), this caveat deserves more attention. To the best of our knowledge,
few papers study the interactions between several di¤erent water supplies. Zeitouni and
Dinar [41] explore the contamination ows between several connected aquifers. Burness
and Martin [5] consider the links between groundwater and surface water, in their mod-
eling of the instantaneous rate of aquifer recharge caused by groundwater pumping, by
river e¤ects. They model these e¤ects asas externalities that increase intensive pump-
ing. Azaiez [2] develops a multi-stage model to determine how much surface water must
be imported for irrigation and to articially recharge the aquifer, which is also and si-
multaneously used for irrigation. Pongkijvorasin and Roumasset [26] develop an optimal
control model where groundwater users enjoy positive externalities from canal conveyance
loss and from return ows to the aquifer from irrigation. But, these studies still consider
surface and groundwater as two separate entities, only related by the fact that some sur-
face water is lost to deep percolation or is used for aquifer recharge, representing positive
externalities on the aquifer. None of them considers the idea of both water resources
4
coming from the same source, so that the use of one may limit the availability of the
other. Such situations obviously occur when rainwater is harvested directly, because it
prevents replenishment of the aquifers; but generally speaking they can also arise when
water is diverted from rivers that contribute to groundwater recharge6 or with dam con-
structions that stop ows towards the downstream parts of water basins, where aquifers
may exist. We help to ll this gap in the literature by closely linking groundwater and
rainwater harvesting. As a consequence, this model contributes to a deeper understanding
of conjunctive use and complements the existing literature by analyzing two additional
features: hydrological relationships and ow constraints of surface water.
3. Modeling the conjunctive use of rainwater and groundwater
At each time period t, water can be abstracted from the system by collecting rain-
water, wr(t), and extracting groundwater, wg(t). Rainwater is directly captured from
precipitation, R, falling within the water basin, but the storage of this water is limited by
the capacity of the available technology, wr  W . We also assume that it is not possible
to collect the entire precipitation: W < R. Consequently, part of the remaining rain ows
over the land as surface runo¤, with  2 (0; 1) denoting the runo¤ coe¢ cient, while the
other part replenishes the aquifer. The dynamics of the groundwater elevation, h, can
then be written:
_h = (1  ) (R  wr(t))  wg(t) (1)
The total cost of collecting rainwater is K  wr, where K > 0 is the unit cost. Following
the literature, the cost of extracting wg units of groundwater depends on the stock and
is given by C(h)wg. As usual, the unit pumping cost, C(h), is decreasing with water
elevation at a decreasing rate. This means that the dependence of the extraction cost on
the stock, C 0(h)wg, increases with higher water head levels.
C 0(h) < 0; C 00(h)  0 (2)
The capacity of the aquifer is known with certainty and the maximum elevation is denoted
by h > 0. At this level, the unit and marginal pumping costs are zero, while for an empty
aquifer, the unit cost becomes very large.
C(h) = C 0(h) = 0; lim
h!0
C(h) = +1 (3)
Total water abstraction,w = wg + wr , is used for irrigation. As usual in the literature,
irrigation demand is a positive, continuous and strictly decreasing function of price, P .
We can then deduce that social benets from water consumption are given by the area
under the inverse demand curve, P (w) net of water costs. We assume that the marginal
social benet is decreasing with water consumption at an increasing rate:
P 0(w) < 0; P 00(w)  0 (4)
6For instance, water diversion in the Lower Tarim River in China induces a decline in groundwater
recharge [16].
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The social benet from water consumption, net of costs, is thus given as follows:Z w
0
P (x)dx  C(h(t))wg(t) Kwr(t) (5)
We can now analyze the optimal management of these interconnected water resources.
4. The optimal use of groundwater with rainwater storage
The social planner chooses the optimal consumption of both water resources in order
to maximize the sum of discounted net benets (Eq 5), given the law of groundwater
dynamics (Eq 1) and subject to the constraints that both extraction (denoted GW here-
after) and rainwater collection (denoted RW hereafter) are non-negative and that RW is
upper-bounded by the capacity limitation. Given a discount rate  > 0, the problem can
be written as follows:
max
wg(t);wr(t)
R +1
0
exp t
R wg(t)+wr(t)
0
P (x)dx  c(h(t))wg(t) Kwr(t)

dt
w.r.t
8<:
_h = (1  ) (R  wr(t))  wg(t)
wg(t)  0; W  wr(t)  0
h0 given and h(1) free
(6)
The current value of the Hamiltonian for this optimal management problem is:
H =
Z (wg(t)+wr(t))
0
P (x)dx c(h(t))wg(t) Kwr(t)+(t) ((1  ) (R  wr(t))  wg(t)) (7)
where (t)  0 is the shadow value of a unit of water held in the aquifer. The social
planner seeking optimal water consumption has three options to choose from: only GW,
only RW, or a combination of both. Let us add these additional constraints on controls,
wg(t) and wr(t), to dene the Lagrangian of the Hamiltonian (Eq 7):
L = H + g(t)  wg(t) + r(t)  wr(t) + W (t)  (W   wr(t)) (8)
where g(t) and r(t) are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the non-negativity
constraints on, wg(t) and wr(t) respectively, and W (t) that associated with the capacity
constraint W . This formulation leads us to identify three possible regimes.7 Optimal
water uses must therefore be chosen to satisfy the following rst order conditions:
P (wg(t) + wr(t))  C (h(t))  (t) + g(t) = 0 (9)
P (wg(t) + wr(t)) K   (1  )(t) + r(t)  W (t) = 0 (10)
g(t)wg(t) = 0; r(t)wr(t) = 0; W (t) (W   wr(t)) = 0 (11)
g(t); r(t); W (t)  0; wg(t)  0; and wr(t) 2 [0;W ] (12)
7With 3 multipliers, we usually expect 23 cases. But (i) the capacity and non-negativity constraints
on RW cannot both be satised, (ii) by our boundary conditions at least one source of water is used,
(iii) if only RW is used the capacity may or may not be reached, and (iv) there is a boundary regime for
which the use of GW or RW is indi¤erent.
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Condition (Eq 9) represents the optimality condition, which states that the marginal
benet of GW is equal to the marginal social cost of GW extraction and its corresponding
Lagrange multiplier. The social cost of GW extraction, or the full marginal cost of GW,
is determined by the sum of the extraction cost and the shadow value of groundwater
resource. Likewise, condition (Eq 10) represents the optimality condition for RW, taking
into account the implicit price associated with the capacity constraint on RW harvesting.
Conditions (Eq 11) and (Eq 12) correspond to the standard slackness conditions.
We must also take into account the dynamics of the resource and its shadow price,
characterized by the two following equations:
_h(t) = (1  ) (R  wr(t))  wg(t) (13)
_(t) = (t) + C 0 (h(t))wg(t) (14)
Let us rst explain the structure of the stationary solution. RW can be thought
of as a backstop resource for GW, since it is a perfect substitute that is developed as
GW gets depleted. Remember that for full aquifers, the unit pumping cost is negligible
(see Eq 3). Moreover, the concepts of backstop resource and the ordering of resource
extraction are already established in the literature (Koundouri and Christou [18], Krulce
et al. [21], Roumasset and Wada [33]). As a consequence, we know that optimality
requires resources to be used following a least-cost-marginal-opportunity-cost rule rst-
extraction rule, where the marginal opportunity cost includes extraction and marginal
user costs. As such, the optimal steady state may or may not entail groundwater use
with RW harvesting. Typically, RW harvesting will not be used as long as the marginal
benet of water consumption is lower than the RW marginal opportunity cost at the
steady state. However, we know that the water table declines before the steady state is
reached. If the water table falls to a level such that the marginal pumping cost is higher
than the harvesting cost, i.e., c(h) > K, but the marginal benet of water consumption is
higher than the GWmarginal opportunity cost, we know for sure that we will end up with
the conjunctive steady state in which RW harvesting is used at capacity.8 This discussion
is summarized in the following su¢ cient condition for the emergence of a conjunctive use
system:
P (R) > K   1

C 0
 
C 1(K)

(R W ) (15)
Given this emergence condition (Eq 15)9, we know that RW harvesting is economically
feasible. We can now analyze equations (9) to (11) in order to characterize the steady
state equilibrium of the optimization problem (6), and examine its qualitative properties.
All the results are introduced below.
8This is clearly a su¢ cient condition. Conjunctive use may occur for higher water tables, but this
allows us to rene the analysis.
9Observe that this su¢ cient condition is independent of the runo¤. This parameter can used later
without additional restrictions.
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Proposition 1. Given assumptions on water demand (4) and on cost functions (2) and
(3), and the emergence condition (15), the optimal management problem (6):
(i) has a unique steady state which is a local saddle point;
(ii) leads to the conjunctive use RW and GW, with wr = W and w

g = (1  )(R  W ),
so that the total water consumption is w = (1  )R + W ;
(iii) yields the long term water table hr(;R;W ) solving the following condition:
P ((1  )R + W ) = C (h)  (1  )

C 0 (h) (R W ) (16)
provided the shadow value of the resource: r =   (1 ) C 0 (h) (R W )
Proposition 1 states that sustainable water consumption is given by the sum of the
GW that can be sustainably extracted from the aquifer and the part of runo¤ that can
be captured. From this conjunctive use system, Eq. (16) hows that the groundwater
elevation stabilizes in the long run at a level for which the water price is equal to the
social cost of GW pumping. The determination of the water table level will consequently
depend on the hydrologic parameters  and R, and the size of the RW reservoir W .
According to the literature, this solution is not far from the groundwater-only solution.
It is as if the storage capacity becomes zero,W = 0, so we do not collect RW at the surface.
More formally, the social planner maximizes the sum of discounted net benet (5) from
water consumption with respect to the single control, i.e. groundwater pumping, and
subject to the state equation (1) without any possibility of collecting RW. In particular,
conditions (9) and (14) look similar (given wr(t) = 0), while condition (10) vanishes. And,
one of the main modications comes from water consumption which will be equivalent to
water pumping. This then implies changes in condition (16). All these modications are
summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. A GW-only management problem provides a unique saddle point equilib-
rium dened as follows:
(i) In the long run we extract exactly the natural recharge, wg = (1  )R,
(ii) the stationary value for aquifer elevation, hg(;R) solves the condition:
P ((1  )R) = C (h)  (1  )

C 0 (h)R (17)
provided the shadow value of the resource: g =   (1 )R C 0(h).
Corollary 1 gives some interesting insights into the relevant di¤erences between solu-
tions of a GW management problem with and without RW storage. First, water con-
sumption is higher in the system with RW storage than in the GW-only system, because
a part of surface runo¤ which is lost if there is no storage - is consumed in addition
to the pumped water. Consequently, the marginal benet is lower with RW storage,
which should imply a positive e¤ect on the water table level, as in the case of increased
precipitation.
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Second, RW harvesting enables the social planner to reduce pumping by an equivalent
amount to the storage that would have replenished the aquifer, which may alleviate the
pressure on groundwater. Lower extraction rates mitigate the dependence on groundwater
stocks, c0(h)wg, and consequently reduce the long-term value of the aquifer. Thus, RW
harvesting reduces the opportunity cost of extracting an additional unit of groundwater,
which creates an incentive to extract more water, with a negative impact on the water
table level.
So RW harvesting has two opposite e¤ects on the water table elevation, which sug-
gests that care must be taken in analyzing the trade-o¤ between an increase in water
consumption by W and a decrease in groundwater pumping by (1   )W . Whether
RW harvesting is a hydrologically-e¢ cient strategy (with respect to the water table level)
actually depends on the magnitude of these two e¤ects.
5. The long-term e¤ects of RWH on groundwater resource
Following the literature, the capture of runo¤ is central to the denition of this tech-
nique.10 And the potential for application is appraised essentially according to the quan-
tity of water that can be collected. We have underlined the fact that RW harvesting can
increase the water supply by collecting water that would otherwise have been lost. How-
ever, we have also shown that this process modies incentives with regard to extraction,
so that the e¤ects of RWH are not self-evident. The purpose of this section is therefore
to analyze the extent to which runo¤ collection a¤ects benets from water consumption
and decreases the burden on groundwater. This situation is considered to be environmen-
tally e¢ cient, rather than economically e¢ cient, in the light of our optimal management
approach.
To gain intuition of this, consider the extreme case in which there is no runo¤:  = 0.
IIt is straightforward that water consumption w will be the same with and without RW
storage, since there is perfect equivalence between the amount of water available on the
surface and in the ground. Marginal benets from water consumption are thus identical,
while the long-term marginal social costs are di¤erent. Given our assumptions on the
cost function, the water table level in a GW-only management problem will be higher to
satisfy simultaneously Eqs (16) and (17). Here, there is only a cost e¤ect, which reduces
the incentives to conserve water for later uses.
Conversely, with an extreme rate of runo¤:  = 1, not one drop of rain will soak into
the soil to recharge the aquifer. The problem is sharply modied since the groundwater
resource is now non-renewable. In a scenario without any RW storage, the aquifer will
be exhausted and water consumption will end in the long run; the long-term marginal
cost becomes innite, as does the water price. However, with RW storage, the water
price is bounded by the RW supply, meaning that extraction will stop before the stock is
exhausted. In this specic case, the result depends only on a demand e¤ect whereby RW
harvesting conserves a higher water table level.
10For more details, see Boers and Ben-Asher [3]
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This brief analysis shows that for extremely low values of runo¤, the cost e¤ect may
o¤set the demand e¤ect, while for extremely high values of runo¤, the demand e¤ect may
be stronger. This raises the question of the existence of a threshold value of runo¤, which
identies the environmentally e¢ cient situation. This result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 2. There exists a unique threshold value of runo¤,  2 (0; 1), such that the
level of the water table in a system without RW harvesting is the same as the level with
RW storage, hg() = hr(). Moreover, 8 > , RW storage is environmentally-e¢ cient.
Proposition 2 highlights the fact that there exists a specic runo¤ rate such that the
decrease in the marginal benet is perfectly balanced by a decrease in the marginal social
cost of GW. In this case, the collection of RW does not preserve more water in the ground.
However, for the geographic areas with higher rates of runo¤, the collection of RW will
enable the social planner to preserve larger groundwater stocks. For this range of values,
RW harvesting is economically and environmentally- e¢ cient. Otherwise, this technique
will increase the long-term depletion of the resource.
However, this threshold value is dened for specic values of storage capacity and
precipitation. In light of Proposition 1, an increase in the size of the reservoir W will
increase water consumption and reduce the pumping rate. This implies a modication in
the trade-o¤ between a decrease in the marginal benet and a decrease in the stock e¤ect,
while there is no e¤ect for the system relying on GW alone. However, we can expect
smaller and smaller demand e¤ects, because the water price decreases at a lower rate
with higher levels of consumption. This implies a larger threshold value, as summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Since the threshold  is increasing with the storage capacity W , we can
say that in order to be environmentally e¢ cient::
(i) the implementation of large storage capacity requires a high rate of runo¤;
(ii) for a given rate of runo¤, the policy-maker should bear in mind the existence of an
upper- bound to the storage capacity.
The determination of the impact of changes in precipitation may appear easier at
rst sight, since water consumption and water pumping move in the same direction. In
light of Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we know that the aquifer head level will be raised
separately in each water system.11 However, it is more complicated to determine the
resulting e¤ect on the threshold. Whether the threshold value rises or falls depends on
the relative strengths a¤ecting the system with and without RW storage. Hence, it can
increase, decrease or remain unchanged, as summarized in the proposition below:
11We can easily compute the partial derivatives: @hr@R =  
(1 )
h
P 0((1 )R+W )+C0(h)
i
 C0(h)+ (1 ) C00(h)(R W )
> 0 and @hg@R =
  (1 )
h
P 0((1 )R)+C0(h)
i
 C0(h)+ (1 ) C00(h)R
> 0.
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Proposition 4. The e¤ect of higher precipitation, R, on the threshold value,  is am-
biguous within our general setting. Nevertheless, with the following restrictions, we can
state that the e¤ect is:
(i) positive with a linear unit pumping cost, C(h);
(ii) negative with a linear demand function, P (w);
(iii) zero using the framework of Gisser and Sánchez [14], which is a combination of the
two previous items.
In contrast to the e¤ect of the storage capacity on the threshold, the impact of changes
in climatic conditions is less clear-cut. They raise the question not only of which areas
experience an increase in precipitation, but also of economic specicities. In regions sub-
ject to climate change, more targeted studies are required to evaluate the environmental
e¢ ciency of an RW harvesting policy.
6. Introducing additional hydrologic parameters
We now extend the previous model to incorporate some improvements regarding the
water system, and we will then discuss the hydrological inuence of these new parameters
on the threshold value. Up to this point, we have been working with two strong assump-
tions: (i) all irrigation water is consumed, so that there is no return ow to the aquifer,
and (ii) there is no loss of collected water.
Now, we consider that there are return ows to the aquifer from both rainwater har-
vesting and groundwater extraction (consequent to irrigation) at a rate  2 (0; 1), and
that a part of collected rainwater is lost at the rate " 2 (0; 1). This loss encompasses
evaporation, leakage and quality degradation. Intuitively, we state that the runo¤ rate
is higher than the loss rate, otherwise RW storage could not capture any runo¤:   ".
We also assume that the proportion of rainwater naturally percolating to the aquifer is
higher than the proportion of stored rainwater which is not lost and which percolates to
the aquifer after use: 1    (1  ").
This slightly modies our optimization problem (Eq 6). First, groundwater and rain-
water are no longer perfect substitutes, and the water supply becomes w = wg+(1 ")wr.
Second, the dynamics of the water head becomes:
_h = (1  )(R  wr(t))  wg(t) +  (wg(t) + (1  ")wr(t)) (18)
Third, condition (Eq 15), which ensures the existence of a steady state with conjunctive
use must be modied to take into account return ows and losses. It becomes:
P

R
1 

> K
1 "   1C 0
 
C 1
 
K
1 "

(R  (1  )W ) (19)
The steady state solutions are obtained through a similar optimization problem taking
into account all the modications, and are characterized by the following proposition.
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Proposition 5. The optimal management problem always has a unique steady state which
is a local saddle point. In this conjunctive use system, RW collection is still wr = W , but:
(i) the steady state pumping rate is given by wg =
(1 )R W [1  (1 ")]
1  , so that the total
consumption is w = (1 )R+( ")W
1  ;
(ii) the long term water table level, hr(;R; ;W; ") , solves the following condition:
P

(1 )R+( ")W
1 

= C (h) 

(1 )R W [1  (1 ")]


C 0 (h) (20)
As for the GW-only system, we merely have to consider additional return ows, so
the qualitative results of Corollary 1 are unchanged, apart from the rst item. We state
that the long-term pumping rate is wg =
(1 )R
1  and the stationary value for the aquifer,
hg(;R; ), is obtained from the following condition:
P

(1 )R
1 

= C (h)  (1 )R

C 0 (h) (21)
Likewise for the basic model, which is extended by the qualitative results on the ex-
istence of the threshold value in Proposition 2 extend: there is still a unique threshold
value,  2 ["; 1  (1  ")], above which RW storage is environmentally e¢ cient.
In fact, there are additional restrictions on the runo¤ rate , due to the reasonable as-
sumptions induced by the introduction of the loss rate and the return ow rate. At the
lower bound, i.e.,  = ", the water consumption is the same with or without RW harvest-
ing (see Eqs (20) and (21)), and there is only, as previously, a cost e¤ect which reduces
the incentive to conserve water. At the upper bound, the result is slightly di¤erent. Since
1    (1  "), the proportion of rainwater which naturally percolates to the aquifer is
equal to the proportion of stored rainwater which is not lost and which percolates to the
aquifer after use, so that RW harvesting does not a¤ect the dynamics of the aquifer. The
long-term pumping cost is the same with or without RW harvesting, but more water is
available in the rst case. There is only a demand e¤ect which increases the incentives to
conserve water.
Let us now investigate the impact of the two new parameters, f"; g. Water loss in the
RW harvesting technology works as runo¤, reducing the available amount of water in the
system. So if we assume the technology just becomes environmentally e¢ cient and the
loss rate increases, then this additional water loss must be compensated for by a higher
amount of runo¤s. Since at the steady state, RW harvesting is at capacity, this means
that we need a higher rate of runo¤: the threshold must increase.
Return ows increase the recharge of the aquifer. Consequently, as for the natural recharge
R, an increase in the return ow rate modies the system with and without RWharvesting:
the same indeterminacy occurs.
To summarize:
Proposition 6. (i) There always exists a unique threshold, which now belongs to ["; 1 
(1  ")].
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(ii) The threshold increases with a higher rate of RW losses, ".
(iii) The e¤ects of return ows on the threshold depend on economic specicities. For
instance, with linear marginal pumping cost and iso-elastic demand, the result depends on
the degree of iso-elasticity.
7. A conjunctive use model with ecological damages
In this nal step, we now add the values of GW-dependent ecosystems to our model,
along the lines of Esteban and Albiac [8]. Depletion, _h < 0, creates environmental dam-
ages to associated ecosystems measured by additional costs. Otherwise, for _h > 0, higher
water table levels improve ecosystems, generating additional benets for society. This
e¤ect is captured by an increasing function G(  _h) with G(0) = 0. Unlike these authors,
we do not introduce linearity. This is why we also require this function, as a standard
cost function, to be convex: G00( _h) > 0. The social planner now maximizes the following
net social benet:Z wg(t)+(1 ")wr(t)
0
D(x)dx  c(h(t))wg(t) Kwr(t) G(  _h) (22)
with respect to GW dynamics (Eq 18).
The emergence condition (Eq 19) must now be modied by adding the marginal envi-
ronmental cost at the steady state mitigated by return ows. It becomes:
P

R
1 

> K
1 "   1C 0
 
C 1
 
K
1 "

(R  (1  )W ) + (1  )G0(0) (23)
The study of this maximization problem is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7. The optimal management problem always has a unique steady state which
is a local saddle point. Moreover,
(i) Conjunctive use is not a¤ected by ecological damages. RW collection is still wr = W ,
pumping rate is given by wg =
(1 )R W [1  (1 ")]
1  , so that the total consumption is again
w = (1 )R+( ")W
1  ,
(ii) GW elevation solves the new condition:
P

(1 )R+( ")W
1 

= C (h) 

(1 )R W [1  (1 ")]


C 0 (h) + (1  )G0(0) (24)
The GW-only system will be modied in the same way, so that only Eq. (21) changes
by adding the new term G0(0). The water table level is therefore obtained from the new
condition:
P

(1 )R
1 

= C (h) 

(1 )R


C 0 (h) + (1  )G0(0) (25)
Since the term G0(0) is a constant and has the same e¤ect on Eqs. (24) and (25),
the analysis of the threshold value, , in Proposition (6) holds, but both the threshold
value and the water table will now also be dependent on ecological damages. By adding
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a xed cost, the water head level is higher, whatever the system, when we take ecological
damages into account.12 But the e¤ect on the water level with RW harvesting will be
lower, because this technique reduces the dependence on the aquifer. If the runo¤ rate
corresponds to the threshold, and environmental damages increase, we typically move to
an environmentally ine¢ cient situation. This means that the threshold is increasing with
damages.
Proposition 8. If we compare equations (24) and (25), we observe that:
(i) there again exists a unique threshold;
(ii) the water table increases in both cases when the damages increase, but it increases
less under RW harvesting;
(iii) the threshold increases with damages.
The last point may seem surprising. In ecosystems severely a¤ected by intensive
pumping, we would expect RW harvesting to alleviate the pressure on aquifers. But,
here we nd that the environmental e¢ ciency of RW harvesting is reduced. This could
result from the way we consider damages: they are linked to changes in the water table. It
would be interesting to include the level of the water height in the formulation of damages
proposed by Esteban and Albiac [8].
8. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the extent to which rainwater harvesting is environmentally e¢ -
cient. More precisely, we investigate whether this technique, used in conjunction with
groundwater extraction, is more e¤ective in limiting aquifer depletion than a purely
groundwater-based system. We emphasize the importance of considering the hydrologi-
cal cycle in its entirety, so that ground and surface water are interdependent and must
be managed as such. In a basic setting, we highlight the fact that rainwater harvesting
should be seen not only as a means to collect surface runo¤ in order to alleviate pressure
on conventional water sources, but also as an economically optimal solution, which will
only be environmentally e¢ cient when the surface runo¤ rate is high enough.
Moreover, the runo¤ rate needs to be even higher when the storage capacity is bigger.
This draws attention to the fact that water policies may have an adverse impact if they
encourage larger storage capacities with no consideration for specic parameters. We
then examine how this result is modied by the inclusion of additional parameters like
evaporation, return ows and ecological damages due to aquifer depletion. Variations in
these parameters a¤ect the likelihood that rainwater harvesting will be environmentally
e¢ cient. This technique could therefore be a long-term solution for groundwater depletion
under specic conditions, which must be taken into account in water policies.
12Note rst that the LHS of equality (20) (respectively (21)) and (24) (respectively (25)) are unchanged,
while the same positive constant is added to the RHS of (24) (respectively (25)). If we remember that
C 0 < 0 and C 00 > 0, the result follows.
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Our approach remains focused on certain specic aspects, and could be extended in
a number of directions. Firstly, we could enrich the ecological part of the model. For
instance, we could link the environmental damages to the level of the water table. This
could even be introduced in a nonlinear way, since the impact on biodiversity is stronger
when the aquifer is depleted. Other characteristics of the aquifer could be included, such
as stochastic recharge, leakage and GW quality.
Secondly, in this paper we assume a xed capacity. However, the RW harvesting
technology can be improved over time. This requires investment strategy and therefore
the inclusion of additional dynamics in the model. This problem was explored by Stahn
and Tomini [35], but they do not explore the question of the threshold in runo¤ rates.
Finally, it is well-known that strategic behavior modies the aquifer level, and its
e¤ect on the threshold should therefore be taken into account in the model. This analysis
quickly becomes very complex, especially when feedback strategies are introduced. A rst
exploration is provided by Soubeyran et al. [34].
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APPENDIX
A. The solution to the general problem
Let us introduce some notations used below:
 2 ["; 1  (1  ")]  2 (0; 1) " 2 (0; 1)
R  (1  )R a  1   > 0 b  1    (1  ") > 0
K"  K1 " w(t)  wg(t) + (1  ")wr(t)
r(t)  
0
r(t)
1 "  0 W (t)  
0
W (t)
1 "  0
A.1. The problem
Let us consider the following optimal control problem:
max
wg(t);wr(t)
R +1
0
exp t
hR w(t)
0
P (x)dx  c(h(t))wg(t) Kwr(t) G

  _h(t)
i
dt
w.r.t
8<:
_h(t) = (1  ) (R  wr(t))  wg(t) +  (wg(t) + (1  ")wr(t))
wg(t)  0; 0  wr(t) W
h0 given and h(1) free
(26)
The current value of the Hamiltonian for this problem is:
H =
Z w(t)
0
P (x)dx  c(h(t))wg(t) Kwr(t) G

  _h(t)

+ (t) [R   awg(t)  bwr(t)]
where (t)  0 denotes the shadow value of the groundwater resource. Moreover, if we introduce the
Lagrange multipliers g(t) and 0r(t) associated with the non-negativity constraints on wg(t) and wr(t),
respectively, and the implicit price 0W (t) of W , the capacity constraint, the Lagrangian function associ-
ated with this program is:
L = H+ g(t)  wg(t) + 0r(t)  wr(t) + 0W (t)  (W   wr(t)) (27)
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The Hamiltonian conditions are given by systems (CTR1) and (DYN1):
(CTR1)
8>>>><>>>>:
P (w(t))  C (h(t))  a

(t) +G0

  _h(t)

+ g(t) = 0 (GW1)
P (w(t)) K"   b1 "

(t) +G0

  _h(t)

+ r(t)  W (t) = 0 (RW1)
g(t)wg(t) = 0, r(t)wr(t) = 0, W (t) (W   wr(t)) = 0 (S11)
g(t); r(t); W (t)  0, wg(t)  0, and wr(t) 2 [0;W ] (S21)
(DYN1)

_h(t) = R   awg(t)  bwr(t)
_(t) = (t) + C 0 (h(t))wg(t)
A.2. The construction of the steady state
Let us consider a steady state satisfying (CTR1) and (DYN1) with _h(t) = _(t) = 0. There are
eight possible cases,since each of the three Lagrange multipliers may or may not be strictly positive. We
nevertheless immediately observe that:
Remark 1. At a steady state: (i) both constrains on wg cannot be simultaneously binding since W > 0,
(ii) there must be some GW consumption (i.e , g = 0) otherwise _h(t) = 0 implies that wr =
R
b =
(1 )
(1 ) (1 ")R > R, which is impossible since wr W < R.
Now let us observe:
Lemma 1. If the capacity constraint on RW harvesting is not binding (i.e., W = 0) at the steady state,
then K" > C(h).
Proof of Lemma 1
Since g = W = _h = 0; the di¤erence between Eqs. (GW1) and (RW1) is:
K"   C (h) +

b
1 "   a

[+G0 (0)]  r = 0 (28)
Using (i) r  0 and (ii)  =   1C 0 (h)wg since _ = 0, it follows that:
K"   C (h) 

b
1 "   a
1

C 0 (h)wg  G0 (0)

(29)
(iii) Notice that b1 "   a =   "1 " < 0 since  > ", and (iv) by assumption C 0 < 0; G0 > 0: The lhs of Eq
(29) is therefore positive and we can conclude that K" > C(h). 
From Lemma 1, we can assert :
Lemma 2. If we assume that
P
 
R
a

> K"   1C 0
 
C 1 (K")

(R  aW ) + aG0 (0) (30)
the RW storage capacity is always binding at a steady state.
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume the contrary, wr < W , so that W = 0: Since  =   1C 0 (h)wg, Eq. (RW1) at the steady state
can be written as:
r =  P (w) +K"   b1 "

1
C
0 (h)wg  G0 (0)

(31)
Using Lemma 1, i.e., K" > C(h), C 1 (K") < h, and since C"  0, we deduce that:
r   P (w) +K"   b(1 ")C 0
 
C 1 (K")

wg +
b
1 "G
0 (0) (32)
Moreover from system (DYN1) at steady state we know that:
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(i) R awg  bwr = 0, awg = R  bwr < R  bW since we havee assumed that wr < W . Moreover
b = 1    (1  ") and 1 >  > ", we can therefore say:
awg < (1  ) (R W ) + (1  ")W < R  (1  )W = R  aW (33)
(ii) The total consumption of water is w = R bwra + (1   ")wr = 1a (R   (b  a(1  "))wr). Since
b  a(1  ") = "  , we have w = 1a [R + (  ")wr]. If we now remember that wr < W < R and
" <  < 1, we can observe that:
w <
1
a
((1  ) + (  "))R < R1  (34)
Under assumptions P 0 < 0 and C 0 < 0 and items (i) and (ii), we can rewrite condition (32) as:
r <  P

R
1 

+K"   ba(1 ")C 0
 
C 1 (K")

(R  aW ) + b1 "G0 (0) (35)
Finally, since 0 < b(1 ")a < 1 (see (iii) of the proof of lemma 1), we can state that:
r <  P
 
R
a

+K"   1C 0
 
C 1 (K")

(R  aW ) + aG0 (0) (36)
Given the assumption introduced in Eq (30), this implies that r < 0 which is a contradiction. 
If we now combine Remark 1 and Lemmas 1 and 2, we can say that a steady state, if it exists, veries:8<:
P (w)  C (h)  a (+G0 (0)) = 0; wg = 1a (R   bW )
W = P (w) K"   b1 " (+G0 (0)) ;  =   1aC 0 (h) (R   bW )
W  0 and wr = W; w = 1a (R + (  ")W )
(37)
In other words, a unique state exists, if there exists a unique solution h 2 0; h to
1(h
) = P
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )
  C (h) + 1C 0 (h) (R   bW )  aG0 (0) = 0 (38)
which veries:
W = P
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )
 K" + ba(1 ")C 0 (h) (R   bW )  b1 "G0 (0)  0 (39)
So let us rst observe:
Lemma 3. If condition (30) is satised, any solution (it is exists) to 1(h) = 0 veries W > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
Using Eq.(37) and W < R, we get w < 1a (R + W ) <
R
a and by Eq. (33) we know that R   bW <
R  aW . If we now bear in mind that P 0 < 0 and C 0 < 0, we can deduce from condition (30) that:
0 < P
 
R
a
 K" + 1C 0  C 1 (K") (R  aW )  aG0 (0)
< P (w) K" + 1C 0
 
C 1 (K")

(R   bW )  aG0 (0)  1(C 1 (K")) (40)
But 1(h) is increasing in h since C 0 < 0 and C"  0. We deduce that the steady state h < C 1 (K")
or C(h) > K". We can therefore say from equation (38) that:
P
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )
 K" + 1C 0 (h) (R   bW )  aG0 (0) > 0 (41)
Since ba(1 ") 2 (0; 1), C 0 < 0 and G0 (0) > 0, we can even state:
P
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )
 K" + ba(1 ")C 0 (h) (R   bW )  b1 "G0 (0) > 0 (42)
or, in other words, that W > 0. 
We can nally a¢ rm that:
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Proposition 9. Under condition (30), the optimization problem (26) admits a unique steady state given
by equations (37).
Proof of Proposition 9:
It simply remains to show that 1(h) = 0 admits a unique solution h 2

0; h

. This is immediate since
(i) 01 > 0 because C
0 < 0 and C"  0, (ii) limh!0 1(h) =  1 because limh!0 C(h) = 1 and (iii)
limh!h 1(h) > 0. However this last point is less obvious. So let us rst observe that limh!h 1(h) =
P
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )
   aG0 (0) since we have assumed that C(h) = C 0(h) = 0. Now remark that
1
a (R + (  ")W ) < R1  since W < R and use condition (30) in order to obtain:
lim
h!0
1(h) > P
 
R
a
  aG0 (0) > K"   1C 0  C 1 (K") (R  aW ) > 0 (43)
(remember C 0 < 0 and R  aW > 0). 
A.3. The local saddle point property
Let us return to the systems (CTR1) and (DYN1) and set g = 0, and r = 0. Since W > 0 at the
steady state we can choose a neighborhood around the steady state such that W (t) > 0 and therefore
set wr(t) = W . In this case equation (GW1) becomes:
2 (wg(t); h(t); (t)) = P (wg(t) + (1  ")W )  C (h(t))  a ((t) +G0 ( R + awg(t) + bW )) = 0 (44)
Moreover @wg2 = P
0   a2G" < 0 by our assumptions. We can therefore apply the implicit function
theorem around the steady state and build wg(t) = 3 (h(t); (t)) > 0. We even know that
@h3 =
C0
P 0 a2G" > 0 and @3 =
a
P 0 a2G" < 0 (45)
It follows that the dynamics of the system is locally given by:
_h(t) = R   a3 (h(t); (t))  bW
_(t) = (t) + C 0 (h(t))3 (h(t); (t))
(46)
It remain to verify that the Jacobian J of this two dimensional system has a positive trace Tr(J) and a
negative determinant det(J). By computation, we obtain:
J =
"   aC0P 0 a2G"   a2P 0 a2G"
C"  3 + (C
0)
2
P 0 a2G"  +
aC0
P 0 a2G"
#
(47)
We can therefore say, under our assumptions, that :
Tr(J) =  > 0 and det(J) =
 aC 0 + a2C"3
P 0   a2G" < 0 (48)
B. The study of the threshold
Let us introduce the system:
4(; h;R; ; ) = 0
5(; h;W;R; "; ; ) = 0
=

P
 
1
aR
  C (h) + 1C 0 (h)R   a  = 0
P
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )
  C (h) + 1C 0 (h) (R   bW )  a  = 0
(49)
with   = G0 (0). The rst equation gives us the stationary water table without RWH while the second
includes this option. So if we solves this system in h and  we obtain the threshold value,  for which
the stationary water table h is the same without or with rainwater harvesting. Moreover this threshold
can then be linked to the di¤erent parameters (W;R; "; ; ).
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B.1. Existence of a threshold
Let us observe that for any admissible (W;R; "; ; ), 8fi = 4; 5g, (i) @hi > 0 since C 0 < 0 and C"  0,
(ii) limh!0 i =  1 since limh!0 C(h) =  1 and (iii) limh!h i > 0 (apply the same argument as in
the proof of Proposition 9). We can therefore, by the implicit function theorem, dene two continuous
functions hg () and hr () which respectively solve in h; 4(; h;R; ; ) = 0 and 5(; h;W;R; "; ; ) =
0. It remains now to study (hg ()  hr ()) since the threshold solves hg () = hr ().
Since  2 ["; 1   (1  ")], let us rst observe that (hg ()  hr ())=" > 0. To verify this point, let
us observe that, for  = ", hg and hr respectively solve:8<: P

1 "
1 R

  C (hg) + 1 " C 0 (hg)R  (1  )  = 0
P

1 "
1 R

  C (hr) + 1 " C 0 (hr) (R  (1  )W )  (1  )  = 0
(50)
This implies:
  C (hg) + (1 ")R C 0 (hg) =  C (hr) + 1 " C 0 (hr) (R  (1  )W )
,
h
 C (hg) + (1 ")R C 0 (hg)
i
 
h
 C (hr) + (1 ")R C 0 (hr)
i
=   (1 ")(1 )W C 0 (hr) (51)
It is straightforward that the right-hand side of Eq (51) is positive, so that:h
 C (hg) + (1 ")R C 0 (hg)
i
>
h
 C (hr) + (1 ")R C 0 (hr)
i
(52)
Finally since C 0 < 0 and C"  0, we deduce that hg (") > hr (").
Second, observe that (hg ()  hr ())=1 (1 ") < 0: In this case, the quantities hg and hr solve:8<: P

(1 ")
1  R

  C (hg) + (1 ") C 0 (hg)R  (1  )  = 0
P

(1 ")
1  R+ (1  ")W

  C (hr) + (1 ") C 0 (hr)R  (1  )  = 0
(53)
Since P

(1 ")
1  R

> P

(1 ")
1  R+ (1  ")W

(remember that P 0 < 0) we can write:
C (hg)   (1  ")

C 0 (hg)R > C (hr)   (1  ")

C 0 (hr)R (54)
Since C (h)  (1 ") C 0 (h)R is decreasing in h, we conclude that hg (1   (1  ")) < hr (1   (1  ")).
Finally by continuity, we can a¢ rm that there exists at least one  2 ["; 1   (1  ")] such that
hg ()  hr () = 0.
B.2. Uniqueness of the threshold
Since this threshold and the associated water table are also obtained as a solution to system (49) for a
given set (W;R; "; ; ) of parameters, we can use the Gale-Nikaido theorem (see Gale-Nikaido [11] or
Mas-Colell [22]) which states that if every principal minor of @;h (i=4;5) is positive and the domain
K =

0; h
  [0; 1] of the function is a rectangle, the solution, if it exists, is unique. Let us verify this
point.
@;h (i=4;5) =
"
 R   1aP 0g + 1C 0  C 0 + R C"
 (R W )   1aP 0r + 1C 0  C 0 + R bW C"
#
with

P 0g
P 0r

=

P 0
 
1
aR

P 0
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )
 
Concerning the principal minors of order 1, we notice that:
(i)  R   1aP 0g + 1C 0 > 0 since C 0 < 0 and P 0 < 0
(ii)  C 0 + R bW C" > 0 since C 0 < 0, C"  0 and R   bW = (1  )(R W ) + (1  ")W > 0
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It therefore remains to compute the determinant of @;h (i=4;5). This quantity is given by:
det (@;h (i=4;5)) =
 
1
aP
0
g +
1
C
0 RC 0   (1 )(R W )R C"  (1 ")RW C"
+
 
1
aP
0
r +
1
C
0  RC 0 + (1 )(R W )R C" +WC 0
= Ra

C 0   (1 )(R W ) C"
  
P 0g   P 0r

| {z }
>0
  (1 ")RW C"
 
1
aP
0
g +
1
C
0| {z }
<0
+WC 0
 
1
aP
0
r +
1
C
0| {z }
>0
hence det (@;h (i=4;5)) > 0 (55)
since C 0; P 0g; P
0
r < 0,C"  0 and because P" > 0, P 0
 
1
aR

< P 0
 
1
a (R + (  ")W )

, i.e. P 0g   P 0r < 0.
B.3. Comparative statics
Let us denote by  one of the following parameters fW;R; ; "; g and let us compute @@ . It we
di¤erentiate system (49) with respect to (h; ; ) and solve the system, we know by the Cramer rule that:
@
@
= det
  @4 @h4
 @5 @h5

det

@4 @h4
@5 @h5

=
N
D
(56)
From Eq. (55), we know that the denominator D is positive. It follows that the sign of @@ is simply given
by its numerator N . Moreover a simple exercice of computation shows that :
@h4 =  C 0(h) + 1

C 00(h)R > 0 and @h5 =  C 0(h) + 1

C 00(h) (R   bW ) > 0 (57)
and
 @4 @5
W 0 ( ")a P
0
r  bC 0(h)
R (1 )a
 
P 0g +
a
C
0(h)
 (1 )
a
 
P 0r +
a
C
0(h)

" 0  W

P 0r
a
+ C
0(h)


RP
0
g
a2
+ 
(R + (  ")W )P 0r
a2
+ 1C
0(h)(1  ")W +  
   a  a
(58)
We can therefore identify, after computation, the following e¤ects:
(i) The threshold and the storage capacity, @@W
sign

@
@W

= sign
0BB@  "a P 0r   bC 0  C 0 + R C"| {z }
>0 since C0<0, C">0
1CCA = sign   "a P 0r   bC 0 (59)
Let us now observe that the computation of the di¤erence of the two equations (see Eq (49)) which
dene the threshold gives:
P
 
1
aR
  P   1a (R + (  ")W )+ bW C 0 = 0 (60)
and the convexity of the inverse demand gives:
P
 
1
aR
  P   1a (R + (  ")W ) >   ( ")Wa P 0r (61)
These two last equations immediately show that

( ")
a P
0
r   bC 0

> 0 hence that @@W > 0:
23
(ii) The threshold and the evaporation rate, @@"
sign

@
@"

= sign

 W

1
aP
0
r +

C
0

 C 0 + R C"

> 0
since P 0r < 0, C
0 < 0 and C" > 0
(iii) The threshold and the marginal ecosystem damage, @@ 
sign

@
@ 

= sign
  a bW C"  0
(iv) The threshold and the recharge, @@R
Since @h5 = @h4 + bW C
00(h) and
 
1 
a

> 0, a routine computation gives:
sign

@
@R

= sign
0B@@h4| {z }
>0
  P 0g + P 0r| {z }
0 (since P"0)
+ bW C
00(h)| {z }
0
 
P 0g +
a
C
0(h)
| {z }
<0
1CA
This quantity is clearly unsigned. For instance if the demand is linear, we have P 0r   P 0g = 0 and
@
@R < 0. But if the unit pumping cost is linear in h so that C" = 0, we observe
@
@R > 0. Finally
in the Gisser-Sanchez case (i.e. C" = 0 and P linear) it is immediate that @@R = 0:
(v) The threshold and the return ow, @@
sign

@
@

= sign

@h4
h
R
a2
  P 0g + P 0r+ ( ")Wa2 P 0r + (1 ")W C 0(h)i+ bW C 00(h)Ra2 P 0g +  
This quantity is again unsigned. To illustrate this point let us assume that C" = 0 so that C 0 =  c0
a constant with c0 > 0. If we add that P (w) is linear (Gisser-Sanchez case) then sign

@
@

=
sign

( ")W
a2 P
0
r   (1 ")W c0

< 0. If we now introduce an isoelastic demand P (w) = w  with
a > 1, then
sign

@
@

= sign
0BBB@

R
a
 
 

R+( ")W
a
 
| {z }
d>0
  a (1 ")W c0| {z }
n>0
1CCCA
so if  > max

n
d ; 1
	
then @@ > 0.
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